The role of scientific paradigms in the assessment of thought Essay Example for Free

The role of scientific paradigms in the assessment of thought Essay Thomas Kuhn, in his work entitled The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, discusses the very nature and necessity of what he calls scientific revolutions. In this particular work, Kuhn sees an apparent parallelism between political revolutions on the one hand, and scientific revolutions on the other. Kuhn writes, â€Å"Scientific revolutions†¦ those non-cumulative developmental episodes in which an older paradigm is replaced in whole or in part by an incompatible new one† (2000, p.503). On a preliminary note, paradigms are frameworks in and through which we approach phenomena, in general. They are models, so to speak. The idea is rather simple. Let us consider the choice of models in epistemological theory. The traditional epistemological schools of thought [rationalism and empiricism] have different models. The model adopted by the rationalists was pure mathematics, whereas the empiricists adopted experimental or empirical science. As one may have already noticed at this point, it is not difficult to see why rationalism and empiricism stand as rival epistemological theories. The choice of model is significant to their fundamental disagreements. Naturally enough, different models employ different methodologies, different methodologies in turn, generate different types of knowledge, which, consequently, have different criteria of proof or validity. Scientific development, as Kuhn contends, may appropriately be characterized by paradigm shifts and this he calls scientific revolutions. It is important to note that scientific developments do not occur in a vacuum. For the aforementioned reason, there is a felt need to situate scientific developments in the historical context within which they are conceived, proposed and ultimately, institutionalized and integrated as part of society’s shared knowledge. This is to say that scientific revolutions are also proper objects of historical analysis and discourse in as much as political revolutions are. Kuhn contends that there is a parallelism between political and scientific revolutions. As pointed out earlier, it is important to note that he characterizes scientific revolutions as â€Å"those non-cumulative developmental episodes in which an older paradigm is replaced in whole or in part by an incompatible new one. † Kuhn’s characterization emphasizes two important points. First, â€Å"that there is a replacement of an old paradigm by a new one†. Second, â€Å"that the new paradigm is not merely something new; it is also incompatible with the old paradigm†. This is to say that the incompatibility or the irreconcilability of the new paradigm with the old paradigm serves as warrant for the necessity of such a revolution. Although there are significant differences in both scientific and political developments, Kuhn argues that one may be justified in using the notion of revolution as a metaphor for understanding them. He writes, â€Å"Political revolutions are inaugurated by a growing sense often restricted to a segment of the political community, that existing institutions have ceased adequately to meet the problems posed by the environment that they have in part created. In much the same way, scientific revolutions are inaugurated by a growing sense, again often restricted to a narrow subdivision of the scientific community that an existing paradigm has ceased to function adequately in the exploration of an aspect of nature to which that paradigm itself had previously led the way† (2000, p.503). Kuhn’s parallelism is thus, founded on the idea that in both cases, a sense of malfunction [in our institutions as for the case of the political, and in our paradigms as for the case of the scientific] necessitates for the occurrence of a revolution. References Kuhn, T. (2000). â€Å"The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. † The Philosopher’s Handbook. Ed. Stanley Rosen. Random House: New York.